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Democracy is widely praised as a great achievement of humanity. However, in 
recent years there has been an increasing amount of concern that its 
functioning across the world may be eroding. In response, efforts to combat 
such change are emerging. Considering the pervasiveness of technology and its 
increasing capabilities, it is no surprise that there has been much focus on the 
use of artificial intelligence (AI) to this end. Questions as to how AI can be 
best utilized to extend the reach of democracy to currently non-democratic 
countries, how the involvement in the democratic process of certain 
demographic groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, women, and young people) can be 
increased, etc. are frequent topics of discussion. In this article, I would like not 
merely to question whether this is desirable but rather argue that we should be 
trying to envisage ways of using AI for the exact opposite purpose: that of 
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1 There are perfectly valid appeals to authority, e.g. as somebody who has little knowledge about cars, I defer much of my decision-making in connection 
to my car, to those whom in my best judgement I consider authorities, say a local car mechanic  
2 It is worth pre-empting any attempts at vindicating Churchill’s attitude by a reference to ‘different times’ by noting that he was severely criticized for his 
abhorrent views by more ethically minded individuals at the time. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The rapidly increasing ubiquity of technology, and AI, in 
so-called ordinary people’s lives has prompted much 
interest in questions focused on the impact of these on 
democracy. All but invariably, the questions discussed in 
published literature boil down to the potential threats 
faced by democratic countries, the democracy itself [19], 
and the means of adapting democracy in a manner which 
would make it more resilient to such challenges [9]. What 
is really worrying in this debate, which takes place both in 
academic circles as well as popular media, are the 
presumptions, not in the least hidden, when such 
questions are asked. Namely, it is taken as primafacie that 
democracy is desirable [31]. Herein I argue that it is not 
and that rather than asking how AI should be used to 
preserve democracy, we should be focusing how AI could 
be used to supplant democracy in a manner which is 
broadly supported and peaceful, with an alternative 
political system which is both ethically principled and 
practically feasible. I understand that this may sound like 
a controversial proposal and having discussed it numerous 
times with individuals with different backgrounds, I kindly 
ask the reader to consider the content herein as it is stated 
rather than projecting a priori expectation onto my word. 
As I suggest already in the title of the article, the proposal 
should be seen as a propaedeutic, and to this end I have 
tried to make a compromise between breadth and depth 





It is a truth nearly universally observed that when 
challenging democracy, one is responded to by a reference 
to a quote attributed to Churchill:  
 
“Democracy is the worst form of government, except 
for all the others.” 
 
Ironically, this short retort illustrates rather well some of 
the key problems with modern democracies. Firstly, it is a 
needless1 appeal to authority, a highly morally dubious one 
that too2 This reflects both the intellectual superficiality 
and inertia of the general public. Secondly, the quote itself 
is incorrect, and the correct statement instead reads:  
 
“Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst 
form of Government except for all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time. . .” 
 
Notice that Churchill does not express his own views here, 
nor is the claim as strong (merely referring to the forms of 
government which have been tried, rather than universally 
all others). Further to the aforementioned superficiality of 
intellectual scrutiny, here we see an example of 
confirmation bias which discourages healthy skepticism 
and so-called fact-checking when a claim conforms to 
preformed or otherwise preferred opinions. This is 
arguably a particularly serious problem in an era of rapid 
mass communication, and the overall information load. 
 
While the idea that democracy is a poorly constituted 
system may be considered provocative in the present-day  





3 For specific examples see: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article- 7084113/STEPHEN-GLOVER-politician-tells-whopper-taken-court.html, 
https://www.mailtimes.com.au/story/6056940/the-greens-field-mallee- candidate-in-federal-election/, https://www.derbytelegraph.co.uk/news/ extinction-rebellion-
protesters-stage-big-3341517 
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zeitgeist, it is far from new. Indeed, nearly two and a half 
millennia ago, Aristotle discussed democracy with 
impressive clarity and thoroughness, describing it as one 
of the degenerate forms of government. His dislike of 
democracy is illustrated well by the discussion in The 
Politics of which is worse, democracy or tyranny.  
 
Aristotle’s arguments ring true today probably more than 
ever. In particular, and with a reference to the 
aforementioned superficiality, lack of education, and 
intellectual inertia of the public, Aristotle quite correctly 
predicted what can be now very clearly seen in practice: 
that nominal democracies quickly become de facto 
oligarchies whereby a powerful few control the opinions 
of many. Given that the human nature has not changed 
since, but that the volume of information and the 
complexity of issues of relevance have vastly increased, 
modern technology makes this control that much more 
potent. The incredible amounts of money spent on 
political advertising and campaigning provide strong 
evidence of this. Would those who spend this money 
really be doing so were it not conducive to their goals? 
 
2.1 Perceived Legitimacy 
 
As just noted, democracies as constituted in modern 
times, quickly become de facto oligarchies. The distal 
power of oligarchs is exercised by means of proxy layers. 
The first of these features in the form of demagogues – 
public figures who appeal to the broad public, usually both 
by personal charisma and by superficially attractive 
messages. Most proximally though, what one observes is 
the tyranny of majority (indeed, Diogenes observed: “The 
mob is the mother of tyrants.”). This is extremely 
worrying as the sheer power of numbers gives this 
dominant group a genuine feel of legitimacy, often  
cynically but correctly described as the counting of heads 
without taking into account what is inside them [27]. 
 
2.2 Vanity and Jobs at Stake 
 
It has been observed over long periods of time and across 
cultures that tyrants relish and demand flattery [23, 12]. 
And it is a rare tyrant more demanding of it than the mass. 
Quite literally not a day passes without an exasperating call 
from one or another that ‘all that we [the public] want is 
for politicians to tell us the truth’ [28]; yet only about 13–
14% believe that they do [21]. Indeed, much of work on 
the use of AI and data analysis for perceived social benefit 
focuses precisely on this – on so-called ‘fact-checking’. 
Putting aside that many of the questions that the public 
seeks answers to are complex and cannot be expressed 
meaningfully in a simple sentence, requiring nuisance and 
often containing extra-scientific, philosophical elements, 
one major reason for the scarcity of truthfulness lies in 
that being a democratically elected politician is now seen 
as a job or a career, as opposed to a social and public duty. 
This fundamentally changes the nature of relationship 
between the governing and the governed. One 
consequence is that politicians are invariably fighting for 
their job and telling the public the somewhat 
uncomfortable truth (such as that they are not sufficiently 
educated to make or judge certain complex decisions) 
would quickly bring one’s career to an end [40, 14, 2]3.  
 
2.3 Inertia or Devils 
Those you do and those you do not know 
 
After the numerous fundamental flaws with democratic 
governance are exposed, the usual attempt at halting 
further engagement with the topic comes in the form of 
the claim that there is no better alternative. When this view 
is challenged, the inadequacy of public education again, 
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becomes apparent: as the alternatives, virtually without 
exception tyranny (dictatorship) and communism are the 
only alternatives that people are aware of. The latter is 
arguably not even a valid alternative, in the sense that it is 
not necessarily a political system but more so a way of 
organizing economy, ownership, etc, (succinctly and 
somewhat simplistically put, given the tangential nature of 
the issue and the manuscript length constraints) – for 
example, there is no fundamental reason why a 
communist government could not be democratically 
elected [10]. But what is clear is the woeful lack of 
awareness of the rich body of work on political theory. 
Few are aware of even the basic concepts, such those of 
duocracy, elected monarchy, and many others [4], let alone 
of the rich milieu of mixed constitutions which can be 
weaved by having different decision-making systems 
interlocked in a coherent manner. Indeed, while this 
discussion is outside the scope of the present article, it is 
a kind of a mixed constitution that we should be seeking 
to replace modern democracies with one which uses 
democratic decision-making in one realm, aristocratic 
bodies (in the original sense of the word, rather than the 
modern pejorative one) in another, possibly random 
polling constituted bodies in yet another, etc. 
 
This ignorance of political theory is in part caused by and 
in part complemented by ignorance of history. The 
general public is virtually entirely unaware of why and how 
the current electoral processes came to be (e.g. the 
Electoral College system in the USA, or the extent of 
suffrage in the UK). To give but one of a plethora of 
possible examples, few people are aware of the major 
changes that the British democracy has undergone even in 
its recent history not the least of which is the expansion 
of suffrage rights (save for women’s rights, which are 
discussed frequently), with the electorate size of 5.7 
million in 1885 (cc. 16% of the population) to 45.8 million 
in 2018 (cc. 69% of the population). 
 
3. Ube Ire, AI? 
The previous discussion of the key fundamental flaws of 
present-day democracies, as well as the reasons why these 
flaws remain largely unnoticed or attributed to practical 
(rather than inherent) factors, shines a light on the steps  
which need to be taken to pave a way towards alternative 
political systems. An outline of some which I propose is 
presented next, in the rough order in which they need to 
be implemented. 
 
3.1 Person’s Value vs Political Role 
 
As intimated in the previous section, an appealing aspect 
democracy lies in the perceived equality between people 
‘at the ballot box’. Thus, any deviation from this state 
inherently creates inequality amongst those previously 
seen as equal, and this is all certain to provoke a vitriolic 
response in many, seeing it as elitism (the kind of elitism 
will depend on the criteria used to effect differentiation 
between individuals). I expect that many (or most) would 
see this as some individuals being seen as ‘better’ than 
others. As the first step towards the liberation from the 
democracy fetish, it is crucial that this incorrect inference 
is rebutted credibly and with clarity.  
 
Firstly, let us observe what ought to be a simple fact: the 
perceived equality does not exist even now even at the 
ballot box. For example, all elections require the voters to 
be at least of a certain age (say, in UK general elections, at 
least 18). This certainly does not mean that children are 
less valued as individuals. Equally, people with some 
mental impairments are prohibited from voting, and yet 
nobody would suggest that they are any less entitled to 
happiness, the freedom from suffering, etc. More subtly, 
there is geographic discrimination (n.b. herein I use this 
word in a non-moralistic, objective sense, and attach no 
judgement to it). Two individuals on different sides of an 
international border do not have the right to vote in the 
other’s country’s general elections. This seems ‘natural’ 
and is accepted by virtually everybody. Yet, how does it 
make sense that an arbitrary chance of birth, entirely 
amoral in nature, should affect such differential power 
(consider the power of a voter in a prosperous country, 
rich in natural resources, and say, with powerful 
international presence vs a small and impoverished one, 
with scarce natural resources and no international power 
whatsoever)? Moreover, inequality already exists not only 
in the eligibility to vote but also in the eligibility to be 
voted in – in the UK for example, only persons aged 18 
or over can be candidates in general elections (until 2006 
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the threshold was 21); in the USA, presidential candidates 
must be at least 35 (which has remained unchanged since 
1787).  
 
All of the above can be the starting points in 
demonstrating that differential roles in the political 
process do not imply differential appreciation of 
individuals, their rights as sentient beings, etc. The usual 
cliche´ used to describe democratic rule is ‘rule by the 
people’. Appealing as this appears to be, it is actually 
entirely beside the point – the aim should be ‘rule for the 
people’, or what Aristotle termed polity. 
 
3.2 Knowledge, Education, and Complexity of 
Politics 
 
That the equality of individuals with respect to their right 
to pursue happiness, etc. does not necessitate equality in 
terms of their political roles is the first step towards the 
goal. Nevertheless, the argument put forward thus far not 
does imply that political inequality is desirable, and therein 
lies the next challenge. The focus here has to be on the 
complexity that underlies effective and principled political 
decision-making. This balancing act requires a strong 
background in history, geography, statistics, natural 
science, economics, and a plethora of other challenging 
subjects. Yet, most people lack sufficient knowledge in 
any one of these [34]; indeed, some prove to be extremely 
challenging even to highly educated professionals [24]. 
This makes policy driven electoral choices, purportedly 
favoured by voters in democratic societies, an unwise 
proposition. There are likely to be two main factors at play 
here, which have been and continue to be studied 
extensively: a person’s perception of own ignorance (i.e. 
lack of knowledge) in a certain domain and the associated 
perception of risk [11]. Put simply, in the context of 
interest in this paper, the voter may be underestimating 
their ignorance of, for example, geography, or they may 
be failing to appreciate the significance of this ignorance 
in their political decisions. After all, nobody is suggesting 
a popular vote on, say, the approval of drugs for 
therapeutic use – there is an understanding that few are 
qualified to make such decisions, despite the  
consequences ‘affecting us all’ as democratic demagogues 
often say. The issue is simply that of competence and it 
must separate from any associations with one’s worth, as 
discussed previously. 
 
One should not be under the illusion that the problem 
succinctly expressed by section’s title can be appreciably 
remedied though more or better education – a less radical 
means than that advocated herein – a panacea like solution 
frequently espoused by the political and intellectual classes 
alike. What is wanting here is not mere knowledge. 
Knowledge of procedural or factual matters – veritism, in 
short [18] – even if reasonably comprehensive, does not 
suffice in the context of modern political decision-making 
where the complexity of challenges encountered requires 
extensive synthetic judgements. Rather, what is is 
necessary is understanding [33]. Admirable in spirit as it is 
when proposed by honest advocates, the idea that the 
general population cane be expected to develop a level of 
understanding of the intellectual realms important for 
meaningful participation in democracy, is utterly 
unrealistic. The idea’s phantasmic nature already becomes 
apparent after a simple consideration of the cognitive 
abilities of the majority, to speak nothing of a myriad of 
additional practical challenges, including the cost that 
implementing such education would entail, the impact on 
the economy effected by universally prolonged studies, 
etc. 
 
3.3 The Cult of Science 
 
Given that my aim is not to provoke controversy for the 
sake of it but rather to highlight important issues that AI 
can help with, it has been my aim to constrain myself to a 
single blasphemy only – that of rejecting democracy. 
Nevertheless, I could not avoid touching upon another, 
without which the complexity of political decision-making 
would be severely incomplete. As the section title reads, it 
concerns what rightly can be called the cult of science. 
This may be strange to read following the discussion thus 
far, so I must elaborate.  
 
Over the last century or so, the West has witnessed a 
remarkable change in religiosity [17]. To quote Franck and 
Iannaccone [17], whose findings are representative of the  
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body of work in this area: 
 
“. . .our statistical tests offer no support for traditional 
theories of secularization (which link decline to 
changes in income, education, industrialization, 
urbanization, and family life). Nor can we attribute 
much of the observed decline to growth in the welfare 
state. But increased school spending by governments 
does reduce church attendance, and this effect is not 
the result of greater educational attainment. In 
shaping the content of schooling, governments may 
strongly influence long-run religious trends.”  
  
A consequence of this decline (which I do not regret, lest 
the reader infer otherwise) has effected a vastly 
disproportionate emphasis and reliance on physicalism, 
with extra-scientific philosophical topics being all but 
entirely marginalized. This is not merely a blue sky 
intellectual objection (or should I say a philosophical 
one?) – political consequences are serious and frequent. 
Science cannot, by its very nature, address questions such 
as how compromises between two lives can be made, how 
a trade-off between the cost of building materials and the 
safety of future residents should be made, and a plethora 
of others encountered each day [35]. Not only important, 
these are issues which are difficult to address in a 
systematic and rigorous way, which requires years of 
training – again, training which few undergo to virtually 
any degree. Thus, it is imperative to make efforts to 
explain the limitations of the scientific method [15], 
promote philosophy as a useful – nae, necessary [6] – tool 
in politics [29], and as before highlight that the general 
public cannot be expected to be sufficiently qualified in 
this domain [22]. 
 
4. The Role of AI 
 
Having considered in the previous sections the reasons 
why a transition from democratic (or at least nominally so, 
as I argued) to alternative forms of government is 
desirable, as well as what the key obstacles to making this 
change are, we are in a good position to discuss what this 
means in the context of AI, i.e. both how and if AI can 
contribute to making the aforementioned change 
successful and lasting, and what (if any) changes to the 
manner AI is governed may be needed. Thus, here I would  
like to begin by considering the two questions separately: 
(i) the role of AI in making the transition from democracy, 
and (ii) the place of AI following the transition. 
 
4.1 Moving Away from Democracy 
 
In the previous section, we saw that the nearly universal 
acceptance of democracy and the outright rejection of 
even the mere consideration of alternatives, is rooted 
partly in a lack of knowledge but perhaps even more so in 
value based perceptions (e.g. the association of one’s 
intrinsic value as a human being, or indeed a sentient being 
more generally, and the person’s role in the political 
system). Changing these is far from an easy task – often 
requiring considerable time and demanding patience in a 
struggle against ad hominem and straw man arguments – 
and I very much doubt that there is anything inherent to 
AI that could make a fundamental difference to this 
process. In other words, AI may make the process more 
convenient, accessible, or engaging, i.e. offer quantitative 
change, but no qualitatively different, groundbreaking 
solution to the challenge should be expected from it. The 
focus should be on leveraging the strengths of AI to shift 
the so-called ‘window of political possibilities’ [7]. Indeed, 
considering that intellectual challenges to democracy are 
so rare, to the best of my knowledge, the present article is 
the first one to consider the potential role of AI in 
transition from democracy. A good illustration of what a 
taboo this very suggestion is, comes in the form of a 
principle from the Montre´al Declaration for Responsible 
AI, entitled “Democratic participation principle” which 
states that artificial intelligence systems “must be 
subjected to democratic [my emphasis] scrutiny, debate, 
and control”. 
 
Before I venture any further into the territory, which is 
doubtlessly speculative, I would like to remind the reader 
that the main purpose of the present article is to put 
forward a proposal and an argument as regards the 
direction of effort in the use of AI in the context of 
democratic governance, that is, the goals rather than 
means of achieving these. Considering that my expertise 
does not lie in the use of AI for knowledge or 
understanding transfer, I think that there is limited value 
in my thoughts on the matter. I am confident that there is  
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a proverbial army of people who can come up with far 
more innovative and effective ideas in this realm than 
myself but for the sake of completeness I would like to 
plant a seed by suggesting a few which readily spring to 
mind and which may prove useful. 
 
Having said the above, one avenue that comes to mind 
immediately could be categorized under the broad 
umbrella of ‘gamification’ [25]. It is easy to envisage, let us 
call them games, simulating processes such as political 
decision-making in differently constituted parliaments 
with the ‘player’ working with and against intelligent 
actors whose values, motives, and behaviours are driven 
by a learning AI. This could bring into light many of the 
issues previously discussed, e.g. how different 
organizational systems constrain power or facilitate 
consensus, how the distorting effects of selfishness are 
exhibited in various settings, etc. Alternatively, the same 
can be done in simulating the impact of different decisions 
on the social level, with AI used to model the behaviour 
of the public, which affects and is affected by electoral 
results, etc. As a caveat, it is important to be aware of 
potential pitfalls [38] and in particular ensure that the eye 
is firmly on the actual goal, and not trivialize important 
matters, turning the end product into mere entertainment. 
 
4.2 AI Within the Alternative System of 
Government 
 
Unlike in the previous case, when our concern was the 
role of AI in making a political transition, the discussion 
of which is entirely absent in the current literature, when 
it comes to the consideration of AI within a system of 
government which we desire to maintain and strengthen, 
we are on a somewhat more familiar territory. While it is 
true that the literature thus far focuses on the 
aforementioned goals within the democratic system only, 
many of the same aims and concerns remain unchanged 
in alternative systems (at least in those of the kind which 
I would consider advocating and which I would like to see 
discussed more widely). 
 
Considering our ever greater reliance on AI and the 
increasing delegation of decisions which would have 
traditionally been made by humans, to AI, I would err if I 
did not touch upon the possibility of AI being directly 
involved in our political systems, i.e. of AI itself making 
some legislative decisions. I trust that at least with this 
point I am on safe ground when I say that such 
suggestions should be firmly rejected (that is, as long as we 
are talking about non-sentient AI; the development of 
sentient AI, which I would not welcome on ethical 
grounds, would demand that this question is revisited). As 
I noted earlier, while there is no doubt that the relevant 
knowledge, understanding, and reasoning skills, all of 
which are necessary for meaningful political engagement, 
are woefully lacking in the general public – and AI already 
exceeds human capacity in regard to these in many 
specialist areas [5], and can reasonably expected to do so 
in many more in future – political decision-making is at 
every stage intricately interwoven with ethical, value based 
judgements which cannot even in principle be formalized 
[1] (in no small part because our belief systems are 
internally inconsistent; the very simple example of 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem [3] should be enough for 
one to imagine the actual complexity of making consistent 
political judgements in the real world). 
 
Having rejected direct involvement in AI, we are in the 
familiar territory of the kinds of discussion which have 
been taking place for a while now. Issues such as privacy 
(including security and data provenance) [20, 26], 
transparency and Explainability [31, 41], decisional 
autonomy [16, 26, 37], monopoly over developments in 
AI [31], legislators’ expertize [31], bias [32], and numerous 
others are hotly debated in academia, industry, legislature, 
and mainstream and alternative media, and they are not sui 
generis to democracy. While it is outside the scope of the 
present article to discuss these issues in detail (and I 
should note that I do find myself in disagreement, if not 
with conclusions then with the form of the arguments put 
forward in many of the papers I cited), their nature in large 
part transcends the specifics of political governance 
(again, with an understanding that we are constraining our 
discussion to the political alternatives of the kind I 
suggested, rejecting e.g. tyranny, etc.), and thus in an 
alternative system of governance their role remains largely 
unaltered from that which they have in democracies. 
 
Take privacy for example, and with it the family of issues 
which fall within the broad cluster of related 




4 At the same time, it should be noted that this nearly universal agreement regards the principle in rather vague terms. Defining the term with any precision while maintaining 
this consensus has proven to be a challenge in practice [37]. 
5 The details pertaining to these are well beyond the scope of the present article. However, for clarity, it is worth making a couple of notes. Firstly, my use of the word ‘right’ 
is different in the two prerequisites mention. In the case of free speech, the right is a guarantee against persecution by state but does not imply a guarantee of a platform (or 
indeed, a lack of legal, social consequences). In contrast, the right to education should, in my opinion, entail more. The weakest interpretation thereof is the right not to be 
refused education. A stronger understanding of the right would be to understand it as a guarantee of education, whatever one’s circumstances. I would argue for the latter – 
and more, a requirement of a certain level of education. Without it, individual autonomy in political decision-making can only be illusory. 
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considerations. Our collective desire to protect 
individuals’ right to privacy is first and foremost 
motivated by what we all but universally feel is a part of 
our self 4  [30], and hence something that we deem a 
universal right (there should never be any doubt that the 
recognition of this right is a decision, rather than an 
expression of some objective truth). This principle is not 
altered with the change of a political governance model 
within which it exists. At the same time, the ability of 
individuals to protect their privacy is also important in 
preventing any sound political system from being 
perverted (e.g. by compromising individuals’ autonomy 
within the system). 
 
As regards the underpinning principles, many similar 
remarks to those made about privacy also apply to issues 
related to autonomy. However, there are some interesting 
considerations pertaining to the concept of individual 
autonomy which do emerge as we move away from 
democratic societies. The reader will recall my objection 
to the professionalisation of politics from Section 2.2, and 
the distortion of the decision-making process which it 
effects. This distortion results from what can be seen as a 
loss of autonomy – political decisional autonomy is traded 
off for greater job security, the opportunity to make a 
difference in future, etc. It is self-evident that this 
distorting pressure is lessened (I have little doubt that its 
complete elimination, and that of the variety of sources it 
can emerge from, is impossible whatever the political 
structure may be) when legislators are not democratically 
elected. But even in admissible non-democratic systems of 
government, the right to autonomy in political decision-
making on the level of an individual remains of paramount 
importance. In particular, one should be under no illusion 
that there is a form of government perfectly resilient to 
human folly. Therefore, there must remain a legal and 
orderly mechanism for an extraordinary suspension of the  
normal governing structures, e.g., by means of 
spontaneously evoked referenda, similar in nature to 
Federal Popular Initiatives in Switzerland [39], initiated by 
members of the public. For this mechanism to serve its 
intended purpose, a number of prerequisites for political 
decision-making autonomy have to be ensured. Amongst 
these I would include the right to free speech and the  right 
to education 5 , amongst others. The legitimacy of any 
government must, in one form or another, come from the 
people that it governs. The reader should not be under the 
misapprehension that this is not possible in non-
democratic societies; quite in fact, I would consider it a 
requirement for a system to be admissible to 
consideration. As in many other instances, the potential of 
AI both as an ally and an adversary has been recognized. 
There is, for example, no doubt that AI can be used to 
improve the quality and reach of education delivery [8]. 
However, it is the concerns over the capacity of AI to 
undermine autonomy which largely dominate the debate, 
both within and without academia [31, 26, 13]. These 
concerns were made – the reader will not be surprised to 
hear so at this point – with the mechanistically and 
unquestioningly taken presumption which I highlighted 
right at the start of the present article, that the context is 
that of a democratic political system and that this system 
is indeed desirable [36]. One of the reasons why AI poses 
threat in this context stems from its ability to amplify 
many of the inherent flaws of democracies which I 
highlighted in Section 2. It is again the case that we are not 
yet dealing with any sui generis aspects of AI but rather 
with a change in scale; quantity rather than quality. Take 
so-called “fake news” for example. It is hardly a new 
phenomenon – there are plenty of examples of it to be 
found on ancient Roman Imperial coins, or in history of 
the Achaemenid Empire, to give just a couple of examples. 
What AI made possible, of course with the complex 
facilitatory infrastructure underlying it, is to increase the 
reach of false information (speed of spread, rate of 
generation, etc.), while maintaining its specificity and 
personalization. While misinformation being spread 
cannot be welcome in any political system, it is particularly  
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damaging in democracies because it targets the primary 
agents from whom political decision-making starts. And 
these agents are rather easy to manipulate, for reasons 
related to education, ability, etc. I outlined in Section 3. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The progress made in artificial intelligence technology 
over the last decade has been nothing short of staggering. 
Considering that artificial intelligence – its nature and the 
potential for the good and the sinister – has been a topic 
of serious discussion since the earliest days of modern 
computers, it is rather ironic that the aforementioned 
progress caught many on the back foot. On the one hand, 
the benefits of AI are difficult to overlook, so it is of little 
surprise that AI is rapidly finding its use in so many 
aspects of our lives. Considering its power (already 
realized or potential), it is equally unsurprising that AI is 
having effects on our systems of governance, and in this 
there is possible danger. Hence, a lot has already been said 
and written about the manner in which artificial 
intelligence and its developments should be regulated or 
otherwise directed so as to protect, strengthen, or 
maintain modern democracies. In the present article I 
made a radical departure from the published scholarly 
work. Firstly, I challenged the presumption that 
democracy is at all desirable and described a number of its 
serious, fundamental flaws. Hence, I argued that the focus 
of AI in this realm should rather be to facilitate a transition 
from modern (nominal) democracies to alternative forms 
of government which comprise a mixture of democratic 
and non-democratic elements. I elucidated the key 
obstacles to this process and identified what the focus 
points of AI should be so that they can be overcome. 
Finally, I discussed what role of AI should play both in 
the aforementioned political transition as well as in a 
society governed by an acceptable alternative political 
model of the kind which I argue for. 
 
In closing, as the reader reflects on my arguments, I stress 
that while my ultimate desire is to have the reader fully 
convinced of the soundness of my proposals, I would be 
content with achieving a much more modest goal of 
making it understood that non-democratic governance 
can be founded on philanthropic, compassionate, and  
humanistic grounds (rather than on selfishness, 
subjugation, and nihilism), and as such a topic which is not 
summarily and unthinkingly rejected by emotive cliche´ 
charges of “extremism”, “elitism”, and the like. 
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